As violence ravages the Gaza Strip, the hostages abducted by Hamas remain in captivity, and the Iranian attack on Israel increases the threat of regional escalation, we find ourselves struggling with the question of why the spiral of violence in the Middle East shows no signs of slowing down. What can be done to stop it? An interview with professor emerita of Islamic studies Gudrun Krämer and conflict researcher Jannis Julien Grimm, head of the “Radical Spaces” research group at Freie Universität Berlin.

Professor Krämer, Dr. Grimm, before we discuss the risks posed by an expansion of the war in Gaza, let us return to the beginning of the latest escalation of violence in the Middle East, to the Hamas-led attack on Israel on October 7. Do you think it is already possible to understand and accurately classify the full significance of that day?

Gudrun Krämer: One day, historians will have to assess whether October 7, 2023, should be ranked alongside the attacks on September 11, 2001, in the United States; essentially, whether it was a watershed moment or yet another escalation of an existing conflict.

On that question I am rather skeptical, but there is no doubt that October 7 constitutes a turning point. It has caused tremendous suffering and further inflamed emotions. Still, in my opinion, it is too early to say whether and to what extent it has changed the fundamental dynamics of the conflict.

Jannis Julien Grimm: In conflict studies, we use the term “critical juncture,” to describe moments such as October 7. Put simply, a critical juncture represents a rupture that can serve as a peak or turning point in a larger conflict. We also talk about transformative events – incidents that challenge our settled understanding of reality, the discourses and images that we have formed and gotten used to of a situation or a conflict, such as the one in Palestine/Israel.

These extraordinary events have the effect of provoking extremely strong reactions in people through the moral shocks they induce. They can destabilize their worldviews. In this sense, the fragile equilibrium in the conflict between Hamas and Israel, which observers – at least those residing outside the occupied territories – had gotten somewhat used to over the past years, has been decisively shaken. Prior to October 7, many people in Israel thought that Hamas could be contained and controlled; conversely, since the Oslo Accords in 1993, the assumption that Palestinians would someday come to have their own state through negotiations had been the guiding motif of politics in the Palestinian territories, even if hardly anyone really believed in this promise in view of the incessant expansion of illegal settlements in the West Bank.

Most people with knowledge of the situation knew that these paradigms were misleading given the unsustainable status quo, but because of lacking alternative visions, they rarely dared to question them. October 7 has shattered this illusion. At the same time, paradoxically, it has also created space to think about new approaches, including radically different solutions.

When such a serious attack and then a war on this scale occur, it is crucial to discuss the situation in a nuanced, sober, and consensus-oriented manner. But the exact opposite usually happens: the debate polarizes society – including at universities for example. What have your personal experiences been thus far?

Gudrun Krämer: I have observed others becoming radicalized. Much depends, of course, on the perspective from which they view this series of events. Some contextualize October 7 and its consequences within a history of colonialism and legitimate resistance to it, while others see it as a further chapter in the history of antisemitism and a hatred of Jews that goes well beyond Israel. For historical reasons, polarization is particularly strong in Germany. It stands in stark contrast to how the debates have been conducted in say, France, Italy, or Spain. I don’t think that we will be able to be rein polarization in anytime soon.

Jannis Julien Grimm: The way I see it, we as scholars have found ourselves in a normative minefield, even more so than in other conflicts such as the war in Ukraine. We are being drawn into a debate that has little to do with understanding why different parties to the conflict act the way they do.

This debate primarily expects people to condemn one side or the other, to take sides. Even silence is interpreted as a statement in support of one conflict party or the other, as a kind of tacit approval. But in truth, silence is often an expression of a more nuanced view of the conflict and a rejection of polarizing binaries. Likewise, empathy is not a zero-sum game. If several communities are suffering and grieving at the same time in a violent conflict, then empathy and solidarity can also be extended to several communities at the same time.

As a researcher, do you feel a certain tension between the pressure to say something and your professional ethos of remaining independent and committed only to the truth?

Jannis Julien Grimm: As a conflict researcher, I lose my integrity if I do not clearly call out violations of human rights and international law, no matter who is committing them. You cannot denounce the killing of civilians on one side of the conflict and justify their death on the other. But this is precisely what happens when almost the entire Israeli civilian population is declared a legitimate target in an asymmetric conflict, or when victims among the Palestinian population are dehumanized as tragic but justifiable collateral damage in Israel’s fight against Hamas. Both narratives conflate tactical and normative arguments, which must be kept apart.

A clear distinction between normative and analytical assessments is also important following Iran’s missile attack on Israel: international law does not recognize a right to retaliation, but only self-defense against an imminent danger. It could be argued that the missile attack was provoked by the Israeli airstrike on Iran’s diplomatic mission in Damascus. But that is, again, an analytical argument, not a normative one. The Iranian attack nevertheless remains illegal.

Gudrun Krämer: The conflict between trying to look at events as dispassionately as possible and the expectation to clearly take one side is not new, but is particularly strong right now. I’m well aware that there is no such thing as absolute objectivity or neutrality.

Still, I see my duty as a researcher to speak based on evidence, to step back as far as possible, and to analyze things in all fairness. This is easier said than done, since even as a researcher you have sympathies that are not always evenly distributed. I have colleagues and friends on both sides, even if the first thing I would say is that talking about “two sides” is already a simplification of a highly complex situation.

How can things move forward? Is there any hope at all for a peaceful solution given the current situation? Paradoxically, the two-state solution is being discussed more than before October 7.

Gudrun Krämer: The problem is that we need actors on all sides who actually want to find a solution, or at least a settlement that does justice to both Palestinians and Israelis and grants what each party wishes for itself: a life in peace and dignity, in freedom and security. These actors are difficult to identify at the moment among both Israelis and Palestinians.

Jannis Julien Grimm: I agree. The current Israeli government has declared no interest in a two-state solution, the Palestinian Authority has hardly any support among the population and is perceived as an extension of the occupation, and Hamas is obviously not a partner for peace. Furthermore, it is also unlikely that Israel will give up its sovereignty over the Gaza Strip any time soon after this war. If you think about the implications, this most likely means a prolonged direct or indirect Israeli occupation of Gaza, and possibly displacement of the population. It certainly means further disenfranchisement of Palestinians.

In my view, this development can be avoided only if external actors, first and foremost the United States, intervene and finally start to exert real pressure on the Israeli government. If this does not happen, this current conflict structure will create path dependencies for a continuation of the violence in the future

Not only that: we have been warning for months that the war in Gaza might spread to Lebanon and beyond. The Israeli airstrike on the Iranian consulate and the counter-strike with hundreds of rockets from Iranian territory have provided a glimpse of what such an escalation may look like. What was previously a covert war between Israel and Iran, largely conducted through proxies or intelligence assets, has now crossed the threshold of open confrontation.

Germany must do everything in its power to contain this escalation. The question of who started it is not in any way helpful right now. An attitude based on these principles rarely provides useful guidance on how to halt a conflict that has spiraled out of control – after all, each of the parties involved will answer this question differently and deploy different timeframes of the conflict when making this assessment. I believe it should be clear to everyone, though, that the war on Gaza and the disastrous humanitarian situation of the Palestinian population is undoubtedly at the heart of this crisis. That is why these issues must be addressed without further ado; we need an immediate and lasting ceasefire to prevent a regional conflagration and to end the unprecedented suffering of the people in Gaza.

Pepe Egger conducted the interview

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This article originally appeared in German in the Tagesspiegel newspaper supplement published by Freie Universität Berlin.