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Digital Surveillance and Authoritarian States

Two researchers at Freie Universität Berlin are investigating how repressive states like China and Russia use digital technologies to monitor their populations and bolster their legitimacy.

Oct 31, 2023

Many Chinese people have resigned themselves to the state’s use of facial recognition technologies in public spaces, says expert in Chinese studies Professor Genia Kostka.

Many Chinese people have resigned themselves to the state’s use of facial recognition technologies in public spaces, says expert in Chinese studies Professor Genia Kostka.
Image Credit: Picture Alliance / Caro / dpa

In German newspapers, China is frequently referred to as a “surveillance state” that constantly monitors and subjugates its citizens using facial recognition systems and a social credit system. But its use of digital technologies is not just limited to propping up the repressive one-party state. The People’s Republic of China – which is a global leader in digitization – also applies cutting-edge technology for a wide array of different purposes.

Professor Genia Kostka, an expert in Chinese studies at Freie Universität Berlin, has been conducting research on different aspects of the digital transformation in China for many years now. She summarizes the situation there as follows: “For a time many people assumed that the internet would become an open forum conducive to freedom of expression, and that digital technologies would sooner or later lead to democratization in states like China. This didn’t come to pass. In fact, the Communist Party of China uses precisely these digital technologies to strengthen and consolidate its control over society.”

Part of this includes surveillance, but the government also harnesses digitization on a local level to get a better handle on environmental issues and traffic problems. For instance, ordinary citizens can report instances of environmental pollution via apps. This type of digital feedback for the authorities is typically known as “smart governance” in Europe. Kostka describes this as “the government establishing its legitimacy by finding ways of signalizing to its citizens that it can solve their problems.”

Propaganda Can Only Go So Far

One possible outcome of this development is that there is broader acceptance among many people in China of certain apps that would otherwise be criticized in Europe for posing a surveillance risk. Kostka says that this is because many people are simply resigned to the inevitability of being surveilled and seem to think that the government already has their data anyway.

However, according to Kostka, many people also consider the use of facial recognition technology in the public sphere, contact tracing associated with its application, and even the social credit system that awards and deducts points based on conduct as efficient technologies that were practical during the Covid-19 pandemic and that are simply a part of life.

She believes that the Chinese social credit system is often ascribed too much importance in Western media, as there is no such thing as a national point system – instead, there are local variations of the concept – and participation in these scoring systems is low.

Kostka adds that the state also heavily utilizes digital means of spreading propaganda – but that this too has its limits, as seen in the protests against the Chinese government’s zero-Covid policy in 2022, when simmering resentment of harsh and prolonged lockdowns suddenly manifested in a number of protest rallies, forcing the government to completely change tack on its Covid-19 policies.

Social Media Shutdowns

The protests were triggered by reports on social media of a father who was not allowed to accompany his ill son into the hospital because he did not have his passport with him. The son later died. Kostka suggests that the outcome of these protests can be explained by local governments no longer being willing or able to mitigate the wider population’s discontent, as they had run into budgetary issues precisely because of the high costs of PCR testing and other expenses associated with the pandemic.

This episode also goes to show how the government can use a shred of freedom of expression to its advantage, as it would otherwise remain ignorant of the impacts of its policies. However, this too can become a threat to its monopoly on power when discontent of this nature spikes. Kostka says that this is where censorship measures hit an impasse. In extreme cases, some governments see themselves with no option other than to shut down social media sites.

Some Stark Differences

In Russia both Facebook and Instagram have been banned since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Professor Alexander Libman is an expert in Russian and East European politics at Freie Universität’s Institute for East European Studies. Together with Genia Kostka, he initiated a project within the Cluster of Excellence SCRIPTS that focuses on the Russian and Chinese governments’ efforts to push their official narrative regarding the war in Ukraine by means of digital technologies.

Libman indicates that there are stark differences between state infrastructures to control the digital sphere in Russia and China. The reason for this is that digitalization in Russia was originally pushed forward by private actors rather than the state, which went through a period of weakness in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Under president Vladimir Putin it has thus sought to regain control over all areas of the economy and communication and establish close ties to Russian internet entrepreneurs.

Libman says that there are also some aspects of digitalization in Russia that are perceived by many citizens as helpful and efficient, such as a digital government services web portal that was introduced over ten years ago. He suggests that “this type of e-governance does not necessarily serve the purposes of repression, but can instead be understood as an attempt to modernize the state.” However, this could soon change, as the government services web portal is being used to conscript eligible men into the Russian army.

A Shred of Freedom

Libman says that the Russian state first took notice of how social media could be used to build up a protest movement in 2011. This is when state authorities began to clamp down on the population with increasing severity. While measures were somewhat selective initially, they were soon combined with harsh punishments in specific cases to make examples of those who had criticized the regime. 

However, since the beginning of the all-out invasion of Ukraine, the Russian government has attempted to expand surveillance, which also means that social media networks like Facebook and Instagram have been completely blocked. But there are limits to state control. For example, Telegram, according to Alexander Libman, turned out to be impossible to block.

What all of this means ultimately is that authoritarian states like China and Russia employ digital technologies to consolidate their control, surveil and repress their populations, and spread propaganda. However, if they did not allow a certain degree of freedom, these digital media would lose their purpose. Perhaps this shred of freedom could reignite the spark for change one day.


This article originally appeared in German in the Tagesspiegel newspaper supplement published by Freie Universität Berlin.

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